Abstract We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.
Claim 1 For any mechanism that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality and ex ante budget balance there exists another mechanism with the same allocation rule that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality and ex post budget balance.
Early examples of papers with results along the lines of Claim 1 are Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) , and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) . These papers consider rather special problems, and Claim 1 is mainly used as a step to simplify the constraints of a programming problem the purpose of which is to determine a second best mechanism.
A second group of results concern the relationship between the Vickrey-GrovesClarke mechanism and the AGV mechanism discovered by Arrow (1979) and d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) . In many cases it is then true that:
Claim 2 If there exists an ex ante budget balanced and interim individually rational Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanism then there exists an ex post budget balancing Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational mechanism with the same allocation rule. Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) establishes conditions for when Claim 2 is true, and Krishna and Perry (1998) contains a closely related result. These papers assume independent types and pure private values, but otherwise the analysis is rather general.
Finally, d 'Aspremont et al (2004) establishes that, under quite general assumptions: 2 Claim 3 For any mechanism that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and ex ante budget balance there exists another mechanism with the same allocation rule that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and ex post budget balance.
Claim 1 has previously only been proved for a few special models. Claims 2 and 3 have been established more generally, but in each case the claim is weaker than Claim 1. In Claim 2 only efficient allocation rules are covered, and individual rationality is not required in Claim 3.
The main contribution of this note is to show that, if types are independent, then the statement in Claim 1 is true under otherwise rather general circumstance. This more general equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance in Bayesian mechanism design seems to be known to many researchers, but, to our knowledge, the result has never been put on record in the literature, and the fact that special cases have been proved as intermediate results in many papers suggest that a general offthe-shelf result could be useful.
Our proof also provides an interpretation of the result in terms of efficient, incentive compatible, and interim individually rational allocations of risk. Agents are risk neutral in transfers and therefore willing to insure the mechanism designer at actuarially fair rates, just like an outside insurance provider. The difficulty is that the ex ambiguity averse auctioneers as in Bose et al. (2006) , or when designing collusion proof mechanisms as in Che and Kim (2006) .
2 See Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 in d 'Aspremont et al (2004) .
post budget deficit depends on the type profile and that agents are privately informed about their own types. But, given that types are independently drawn, this problem can be overcome by a scheme that designates one agent as the "primary insurer", providing insurance against deficits that cannot be predicted by the type of this agent. Some other agent, a "secondary insurer", provides insurance for the part that can be predicted by the type of the primary insurer. The independence assumption is used twice in our proof, firstly to show that the incentive compatibility constraint of the primary insurer holds, and secondly to show that the individual rationality constraint of the secondary insurer hold. The assumption of independent types is of course restrictive. We indicate in the last section of this paper one way in which the assumption can be relaxed. If there exist two agents with signals that are conditionally independent given any realization of the other players' types, then our result continues to hold except that the transformation of transfer payments may alter the interim expected utility of one agent by a constant. This generalizes the main result in Crémer and Riordan (1985) slightly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider an insurance problem with privately informed insurance providers, which is used to prove our main result in Section 3. Finally, the independence assumption is weakened to conditional independence in Section 4.
An Insurance Problem
Consider a risk-averse principal who faces an uncertain expenditure (or income) that depends on N signals. Each of these signals is privately observed by a potential insurance provider (henceforth also referred to as "agent") i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., N} . For each agent i ∈ I denote by s i ∈ S i a generic realization of the i-th signal, and define s ≡ (s 1 , s 2 , ..., s N ) and S ≡ × N i=1 S i . The expenditure facing the principal is assumed to be given by a function x : S → R.
These assumptions are restrictive and rather unrealistic in that the expenditure x(s) is assumed to be a deterministic function of the information available to the insurance providers as a collective. The last paragraph of this section contains a brief discussion where we show that one can extend the model to a setting where x is a stochastic function of s.
Assuming that the principal cannot condition on the realized expenditure, but that commitment to an insurance procurement mechanism is possible, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to mechanisms where the agents report their signals and the expenditure sharing rule depends only on the reported signals. While obviously not necessary, we decompose these direct revelation mechanisms into upfront payments from the principal to the insurance providers and contingent payments from the insurance providers to the principal, which has the benefit of making the contracts look more similar to real world insurance schemes:
Definition 1 An insurance contract is a pair p, m , where p ∈ R N and m : S → R N .
We write p = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p N ) for what can be interpreted as up-front payments and adopt the convention that a positive p i is a transfer to agent i. Similarly, we write m(s) = (m 1 (s), ..., m N (s)) and treat a positive value m i (s) as a transfer from i to the principal. Note that m i (s) is the expected contribution by insurance provider i to the accident costs. In case of a loss, the actual expenditure by insurance provider i is m i (s)/π(s).
Definition 2 An insurance contract p, m
• provides full insurance if
for every s ∈ S; • is actuarially fair if
• is interim individually rational if
for each i ∈ I and s i ∈ S i .
• is non-manipulable if
for each i ∈ I and all s i , s i ∈ S i ; Full insurance is an efficiency condition in our setting with a risk averse principal and risk neutral insurance providers. Actuarial fairness is plausible if all bargaining power is on the principal's side: take-it-or-leave-it offers that grant no expected rents are made to the insurance providers. Individual rationality is standard, but note that the non-manipulability condition would not be necessary in a world were the expenditure level is observable. 3 However, if signals are independent, which is the main case studied below, and if the sets S i are countable, then non-manipulability is a consequence of interim individually rationality and actuarial fairness. In general, individual rationality and actuarial fairness imply that non-manipulability is satisfied for almost all pairs (s i , s i ), but may fail on a set of measure zero. Therefore, we need the condition for our results to apply also for uncountable type-spaces, such as the standard case when all signals have support on the unit interval.
To the extent that the assumption that contracts cannot be made contingent on x (s) is viewed as a weakness, the reader may note that when Proposition 1 applies, there is nothing to be gained for the principal by making the expenditure level contractable.
Proposition 1 below asserts the existence of insurance contracts that have all properties listed in Definition 2. Proposition 1 relies on the following condition.
(IND)
The random variables s 1 , s 2 , ..., s N are independent.
Proposition 1 If (IND) holds and N ≥ 2, then there exist insurance contracts that are interim individually rational, provide full insurance, are actuarially fair, and are non-manipulable.
To understand the construction in the proof, it is useful to first consider an insurance scheme where
, and where p j = m j (s) = 0 for all j = i and s ∈ S: agent i provides full insurance at an actuarially fair rate and all other agents are inactive. The problem with this scheme is that, since x(s) in general varies in s i , individual rationality and non-manipulability will generally fail to hold. But s i and s −i are independent, so a solution to this problem is to pick some other agent to insure agent i against the variability that is due to variation in s i .
To see this, consider the decomposition,
Difference between realized and + and conditional expected value
The idea of the insurance contract constructed below is that agent i pays for the first term in this decomposition, while the second term is paid by someone else. These two agents are compensated by appropriate up-front lump sum payments, and all other agents pay nothing.
Proof Fix i, j ∈ I where i = j. Let p * , m * be given by,
k (s) = 0 for every k = i, j and every s ∈ S. By adding m * i (s) and m * j (s) we see that p * , m * provides full insurance. Actuarial fairness is satisfied since
Non-manipulability is trivially satisfied for each k = i, j, as well as for agent j, since m * j (s) is independent of s j . If agent i observes signal realization s i but reports s i , her expected payment is:
where the second equality follows from the independence assumption (IND). Agent i is thus indifferent between all announcements, so there is no incentive to manipulate the contract.
Interim individual rationality holds trivially for each k = i, j, and the above calculation demonstrates that it is satisfied for agent i. Agent j's interim expected payment is:
where the first equality follows by (IND) and the second equality is the law of iterated expectations. Hence, individual rationality holds also for agent j.
The proof of Proposition 1 uses an insurance contract where one agent acts as a "primary insurer" and a second agent insures the primary insurer against the variation that can be predicted by the agent providing the primary insurance. This implies that:
Remark 1 If (IND) holds, N ≥ 2, and i, j is a pair of distinct agents, there exist interim individually rational, non-manipulable and actuarially fair full insurance contracts such that: 1) agent i is the only agent for which the payment depends on his type, and; 2) agents other than i and j make zero payments in every state of the world.
One can also construct contracts in which the role of the primary insurer is divided arbitrarily between the N agents, and in which the role to provide secondary insurance for i is divided arbitrarily among the remaining N − 1 agents. Formally, let α ∈ R N be a vector which may be thought of as "primary insurance weights" in that we require that ∑ i α i = 1, but where any particular α i can be any real number. In the same way, for each i ∈ I, let β i ∈ R N−1 be a vector of "secondary insurance weights,"that is the shares in the insurance against the variation that can be predicted by i. As with the primary weight, ∑ j =i β i j = 1, but a particular β i j may be negative. Now, for each i ∈ I and every s ∈ S let:
We leave it to the reader to verify that an insurance scheme of this form provides full insurance, and is actuarially fair, non-manipulable, and interim individually rational.
The main value of the setup analyzed in this section is to clarify the logic of the results in Section 3. Still, it may be of some interest to observe that it follows from Remark 1 that Proposition 1 continues to hold if there are N signals and K agents, with 2 ≤ K < N. This is true because the role of any agent that makes zero payments in every state of the world is the same as exogenous uncertainty from the point of view of the remaining agents. The usefulness of the observation is that it allows us to convert the framework from one in which the outcome is deterministic conditional on the information to a model with genuine uncertainty. For example, we may consider the case where the expenditure is a loss of a given size and where the agents have information about the probability that the loss occurs. This would seem to be reasonably close to the case of Lloyd's of London, where members jointly provide insurance to a client, as the assumption that the members have private information about the client's true accident risk seems rather plausible in this context. 4 
Ex Ante and Ex Post Budget Balance
Assume now that the N agents i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., N} must choose some alternative a from a set A of possible collective decisions. Each agent i privately receives a signal, or type, s i with realizations in S i , but remains uninformed about s −i ∈ × j =i S j . Preferences are defined over A and a numéraire good called "money."Let t i ∈ R be the transfer of money from agent i. Each agent i has a quasi-linear von Neumann Morgenstern utility given by u i (a, s) − t i where u i : A × S → R. Finally, there is a resource constraint: implementing decision a ∈ A costs r(a, s) ∈ R units of the numéraire good that must be covered by agents' contributions. Note the generality of our model. Each agent i's signal potentially affects agent i's and other agents' preferences as well as the resource requirements.
Definition 3 A mechanism is a pair f ,t , where -f : S → A is the allocation rule. For every s ∈ S the decision f (s) is implemented when s is announced. -t : S → R N is the payment rule. We define t(s) = (t 1 (s),t 2 (s), ..., t N (s)), and for every i ∈ I and s ∈ S the value t i (s) is the transfer from agent i when s is announced.
By the revelation principle it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to truthful equilibria in direct mechanisms. For simplicity of notation, we only consider pure direct revelation mechanisms, but our argument is extendable to the case of randomized decisions.
Definition 4 A mechanism f ,t is -ex post budget balanced if, for each s ∈ S we have:
When budget balance is imposed as an ex ante constraint it is implicitly assumed that a risk neutral outside party, who is unaffected by the choice of allocation, is willing to provide insurance against the ex post deficit. In some applications it is not intuitively plausible that such an outside party exists. More generally, one might argue that if an insurer is available then this agent should be explicitly incorporated into the model. The set up with ex post budget constraint does not rule out the presence of such a risk neutral agent that acts as an insurer. In this sense, the set up with ex post budget constraint is generally applicable.
For the case that signals are independent, it now follows almost immediately from Proposition 1 that, given any ex ante budget balancing mechanism, there exists an ex post budget balancing mechanism with the same allocation rule for which interim expected payments are unchanged for all agents. That is:
Proposition 2 Suppose (IND) holds and N ≥ 2. For every ex ante budget balanced mechanism f ,t there is an ex post budget balanced mechanism f ,t such that:
-The allocation rule is unchanged:
f (s) = f (s) for every s ∈ S, and ; -The interim expected payments are unchanged for all agents:
for every i ∈ I and all s i , s i ∈ S i .
Proof Consider a mechanism f ,t that is ex ante budget balanced. For every state s ∈ S define
which is the ex post deficit under f ,t . Now let p, m be an insurance contract for the ex post deficit x (s) that has the properties listed in Proposition 1. Non-manipulability implies that for every i ∈ I there exists some real number k i such that
To satisfy interim individual rationality, k i must be weakly positive, and if any k i were strictly larger than 0 a violation of actuarial fairness would be implied. We conclude that p i − E[m i (s i , s −i )|s i ] = 0 for every i ∈ I and every s i , s i ∈ S i . Consider the transfer schemet defined ast i (s) = t i (s) − p i + m i (s) for every i ∈ I and s ∈ S.
As the scheme provides full insurance, the mechanism with allocation rule f and transfer rulet is ex post budget balanced.
Proposition 2 does not require either incentive compatibility or individual rationality. However, if truth telling is a Bayesian equilibrium, the same holds true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism, and, if the original mechanism satisfied an interim individual rationality constraint for any set of agents agent, then the same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism. Hence we have shown that:
Corollary 1 Suppose (IND) holds and N ≥ 2. Then, for every Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational and ex ante budget balanced mechanism f ,t there exists a Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational and ex post budget balanced mechanism f ,t such that f (s) = f (s) for every s.
Corollary 1 seems to be known to many researchers, but we are not aware of any paper in the literature that contains the result. Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) show that Corollary 1 holds for every surplus maximizing decision rules. In many settings, surplus maximizing rules are not implementable, either because of interactions with budget and participation constraints (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) or because of interdependencies in values (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000) . Moreover, sometimes inefficiencies occur because the mechanism designer seeks to maximize her own payoff rather than social surplus. Our result, that does not restrict attention to surplus maximizing rules, becomes useful in such settings. 5 Even closer to our result is Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 in d' Aspremont et al (2004) , where a more general condition than (IND) is considered, but where individual rationality is not taken into consideration. This is proved using the exact same construction as in our proof, which is to add an incentive compatible insurance scheme on top of an existing mechanism. Incentive compatibility, but not individual rationality, is preserved under their condition. More precisely, they show that, in the absence of interim participation constraints, Bayesian incentive compatible, ex ante budget balanced mechanisms can be transformed into ex post budget balanced mechanisms if for every real-valued function r (s) , there exists a transfer rule t such that ∑ i t i (s) = r (s) for every s and
for every agent i and every pair s i , s i ∈ S i . In our language this condition is simply saying that for every uncertain expenditure that the mechanism designer might have there exists a non-manipulable full insurance agreement between the agents and the mechanism designer. While the condition it is not expressed in terms of primitives, there are several known sufficient conditions, one being stochastic independence. Our contribution may thus be viewed as clarifying sufficient conditions under which this construction preserves interim incentives to participate. 6 Independence is arguably special and the main objective in d 'Aspremont et. al. (2004) is to establish conditions for when the results in Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988) can be extended, so that arbitrary decision rules can be implemented by incentive compatible and ex post budget balanced mechanisms. They offer a somewhat indirect condition in their Theorem 4, and Kosenok and Severinov (2004) have subsequently established a result that is more transparently expressed in terms of conditions on the agent's beliefs. Although these conditions rule out independent types, Kosenok and Severinov argue that, for fixed type spaces, the conditions are generically satisfied. Somewhat weaker earlier results along these lines may be found in Fudenberg et. al. (1995) .
We close this section by recalling from Remark 1 that we may pick an insurance scheme with only two agents active when transforming the ex ante budget balanced mechanism to an ex post budget balanced mechanism. Since the added payments for one of these agents (the secondary insurer) depend only on the type of the primary insurer it follows that:
Remark 2 If (IND) holds, N ≥ 2, and i, j ∈ I, i = j, then there exists an ex post budget balanced mechanism f ,t satisfying the conditions in Proposition 2 that also has the following properties:
-The change in agent j's payment does not depend on agent j's signal:
for any s j , s j ∈ S j and all s − j ∈ S − j ; -The payment rule for agents other than i and j is unchanged: t k (s) = t(s) for every k ∈ I with k = i, j and for every s ∈ S.
Hence, if truth telling is a dominant strategy in the original ex ante budget balanced mechanism f ,t we can create an ex post budget balanced mechanism where truth telling is dominant for all but a single agent.
An Extension
In this section we relax the independence assumption. The weaker condition that we are considering is called "Condition S" in Crémer and Riordan (1985) . We call it (CIND).
(CIND)
There are two agents i, j ∈ I, where i = j, such that conditional on every realization of the other agents' signals, the signals s i and s j of agents i and j are independent.
Condition (CIND) implies that N ≥ 2, so Proposition 3, unlike Proposition 1, does not explicitly mention this condition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that condition (CIND) holds for some agents i, j. Then there is an insurance contract that provides full insurance, is actuarially fair, non-manipulable, and is interim individually rational for every agent except possibly agent j.
Proof Let p * , m * be given by
It is immediate that p * , m * provides full insurance and is actuarially fair. Define s −i, j = (s k ) k∈N,k =i, j and assume that i observes s i but reports s i . Her payoff is then
where the second equality follows from (CIND) and the fact that transformations of independent random variables are independent. The interim expected payoff from announcing s i when the true type is s i is therefore
where the second equality is an application of the law of iterated expectations. We conclude that every type s i of agent i is indifferent over all announcements in S i , implying that the contract is non-manipulable and individually rational for agent i. Non-manipulability for agent j is trivial, since m * j (s) is independent of s j (but E m * j (s j , s − j )|s j is in general not constant in s j , so individual rationality may be violated for agent j). Trivially, the contract is non-manipulable and individually rational for each k = i, j.
Just like the proof of Proposition 1, the proof of Proposition 3 used a scheme with only two active agents. It follows that we get a close parallel with Remark 1, where the only difference is that we can no longer assure that the scheme is individually rational for both agents:
Remark 3 Suppose that (CIND) holds for some agents i, j. Then, there is a nonmanipulable, actuarially fair insurance contract providing full insurance that is interim individually rational for every agent except possibly agent j in which all agents other than i and j make zero payments in every state s ∈ S and where j's payment is independent of her type.
Next, in the same way in which Proposition 2 follows from Proposition 1, we can use Proposition 3 to conclude for the mechanism design set-up of Section 3:
Proposition 4 Suppose that condition (CIND) holds for some agents i, j. Then, for every ex ante budget balanced mechanism f ,t , there is an ex post budget balanced mechanism f ,t such that:
f (s) = f (s) for every s ∈ S; -The interim expected payments are unchanged for all agents k = j: E t k s k , s −k |s k = E t k s k , s −k |s k for all all s k , s k ∈ S k ; -The change in agent j 's interim expected payment does not depend on her reported signal:
, j s − j |s j for all s j , s j ∈ S J .
Proposition 4 is true regardless of whether incentive compatibility or individual rationality are satisfied or not. However, if truth telling is a Bayesian equilibrium in the original mechanism, then the same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism. Moreover, if for any of the agents other than agent i, truth telling was a dominant strategy in the original mechanism, the same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism. Finally, if the original mechanism satisfied an interim individual rationality constraint for any agent, then the same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism, except possibly for agent j.
Next, just like in the case with independent types we can use Remark 3 to conclude that:
Remark 4 If (CIND) holds for agents i, j ∈ I, then there exists an ex post budget balanced mechanism f ,t satisfying the conditions in Proposition 4 and the following additional properties:
-The change in agent j's payment does not depend on agent j's signal: t j (s j , s − j ) − t j (s j , s − j ) =t j (s j , s − j ) − t j (s j , s − j ) for any s j , s j ∈ S j ; -The payment rule for agents other than i and j is unchanged: t k (s) = t(s) for every k ∈ I with k = i, j and for every s ∈ S.
An implication of Proposition 4 and Remark 4 is as follows. Consider the case of pure private values, when every agent's utility depends only on his own type. Suppose also that the resource costs are a linear function of agents types: r(a, s) = r + ∑ N i=1 r i (a, s i ). Let f * be an allocation rule that maximizes social surplus, i.e. the sum of utilities minus resource costs, in every state. A Vickrey-Groves-Clarke payment rule will ensure that truthful reporting of type is a dominant strategy. By adding appropriate constants, we can ensure that the mechanism is ex ante budget balanced. By Remark 4 we can make sure that truth telling remains a dominant strategy for N − 1 agents when we construct an ex post budget balanced mechanism, and Proposition 4 guarantees that truth telling is optimal for the remaining agent provided that the other N − 1 agents tell the truth. This is Theorem 2 in Crémer and Riordan (1985) . Our analysis strengthens Crémer and Riordan's result because it applies not only to surplus maximizing allocation rules but to other allocation rules as well.
